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I. JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann., Section 78-2a-3(j), this being a case transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. This case involves an appeal and cross appeal taken from the final judgment 
of the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County. The Utah Supreme Court has original 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-2(j) in that the case involves an appeal taken 
from a judgment of the District Court over which the Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-2(4), the Supreme Court on 
March 8,2001, entered an order transferring the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I 
WAS AIM REQUIRED TO PROVIDE NOTICE AS OUTLINED IN THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE AS A PREREQUISITE TO FORECLOSURE 
The type of notice that is required under the contract documents as a prerequisite to 
foreclosure involves an question of contract interpretation which this court reviews for legal 
correctness giving no deference to the trial court. Sanders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796 (Utah Ct. 
App.1992). This issue was raised in Edwards' pretrial motion to dismiss, motion for summary 
judgment, and again at trial (R. at 406, 459, 500). 
ISSUE II 
WAS AIM REQUIRED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE TRUST DEED 
TO GIVE NOTICE TO BORROWER AS A PRECONDITION 
TO RECOVERING ATTORNEY FEES 
The type of notice required under the contract documents involves a matter of contract 
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interpretation which this court reviews for legal correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. 
Sanders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796 (Utah Ct.App.1992). This issue was raised during Edwards 
motion for summary judgment and again at trial (R. at 406,459, 500). 
ISSUEffl 
WAS THE CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED IN A PRIOR ( 
LAWSUIT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action involves a question of law which this 
court reviews for legal correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. Anderson v. Doms, * 
984 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 314 (Utah 1998). 
Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies is similarly a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct.App.1990). This issue was preserved in the 
trial court record in connection with Edwards' pretrial motion to dismiss, motion for summary 
judgment, and again raised during trial (R. at 138,169,406, 500) (T. at 39,333). i 
ISSUE IV 
DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF ATTORNEY 
FEES FOR THE PARTY'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE ORDERED DISCOVERY < 
Whether the trial court should bar the admission of evidence because a party failed to 
comply with discovery obligations involves a matter where the trial court has broad discretion 
i 
in the selection and imposition of sanctions and this court will review under the abuse of 
discretion standard giving deference to the trial court. State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1997); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932,940 (Utah 1998); Tuck v. Godfrey, < 
367 Utah Adv. Rep. 42,43 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 
271,274, (Utah 1997). 
A 
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ISSUE V 
WAS THE ISSUE OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT TO 
RULE 26(e) PROPERLY BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
In order for an appellate court to consider a matter, it must have first been brought to 
the attention of the trial court. Whether the issue has been properly preserved for appeal 
depends on an examination of the trial record. 
ISSUE VI 
DOES THE ESTATE OF JAMES WESLEY EDWARDS HAVE 
STANDING TO BRING THIS APPEAL 
The standing of a party and the right to bring an appeal before this court is a matter of 
law that this court reviews for legal correctness, giving the trial court's legal determinations no 
deference. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991). 
in. RELEVANT RULES OF PROCEDURE 
Rule 26(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under 
Subdivision (a) or responded to a request for discovery with a response is 
under a duty to supplement the disclosure or response to include information 
thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in the following circumstances: 
(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures 
under Subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some material respect the 
information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or 
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other 
parties during the discovery process or in writing. With respect to testimony 
of an expert witness from whom a report is required under Subdivision (a)(3)(B) 
the duty extends both to information contained in the report and to information 
provided through a deposition of the expert. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory, 
request for production, or request for admission if the party learns that the response 
is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or 
3 
( 
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties 
during the discovery process or in writing. 
Rule 26(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: (Trior to November 1. 1999) / 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a request for 
discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no duty to 
supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, except as 
follows: 
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with respect to any 
question directly addressed to (A) the identify and location of persons having 
knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity of each person expected to 
be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which he is expected to ' 
testify, and the substance of his testimony. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he obtains 
information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the response was 
incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response through correct when ' 
made is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend the 
response is in substance a knowing concealment. 
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the court, agreement 
of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new requests for < 
supplementation of prior responses. 
Rule 37(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(b) Failure to comply with order. i 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a person or an officer, director 
or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30 (b)(6) or 31 (a) 
to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, 
including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party 
fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b), the court in which an action is < 
pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among 
others the following: 
(A) an order that matters regarding which the order was made or any 
other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the 
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party ( 
obtaining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support oppose 
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing 
designated matters in evidence; 
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(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party. 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an 
order treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any orders 
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a), 
such orders as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this 
subdivision, unless the party failing to comply is unable to produce 
such person for examination. In lieu of any of the foregoing orders 
or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to 
obey the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, 
unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or 
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is the second of two lawsuits between Bruce Edwards (hereinafter Edwards) and 
American Interstate Mortgage (hereinafter AIM) dealing with the parties' rights and 
responsibilities under a promissory note and deed of trust secured by a home and real property 
located at 4695 Burch Creek Drive, South Ogden, Utah. Both actions were brought in the 
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County. 
In the first suit, Bruce C. Edwards v. American Interstate Mortgage and Douglas M. 
Durbano, Civil No. 940900438, Mr. Edwards brought suit against AIM and its successor trustee, 
seeking declaratory judgment as to the rights of the parties and to enjoin a threatened nonjudicial 
foreclosure of the trust deed. AIM in turn counterclaimed seeking to judicially foreclose on its 
security and for attorney fees and other relief. Following AIM's motion for summary judgment, 
the District Court denied the remedy of foreclosure as the secured party had failed to give 
borrowers the notice of default and time to cure required in the promissory note. At trial, the 
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District Court granted judgment to the trust deed holder for $1210.56, representing two missing 
monthly trust deed payments, while denying AIM's request for over $19,000.00 in attorney fees 
and costs. The judgment was paid and satisfied by Mr. Edwards within the time ordered by the 
court. No appeal was taken from the court's final judgment (R. at 392). 
In this action, American Interstate again brought suit against Bruce C. Edwards seeking 
judicial foreclosure of its trust deed on the South Ogden home, claiming a default in the non 
payment often monthly payments of $700.65 each under the promissory note, along with court 
costs and attorney fees. In addition, AIM sought to recover the $19,930.20 in attorney fees that 
it was denied in the prior suit. After hearing on Edwards' motion to dismiss/summary judgment, 
the trial court ruled that AIM's request for attorney fees incurred in the earlier suit was barred by 
res judicata and collateral estoppel as to Bruce Edwards (R. at 099 and 205). Later, the action 
was dismissed as to Bruce Edwards when it appeared that his interest in the property was 
possessory only. His parents, James and Helen Edwards, the owners of the South Ogden home 
were then joined in this action as parties defendant. (R. at 251). Upon cross motions for summary 
judgment, the District Court allowed the suit to proceed against James and Helen Edwards on the 
issues of the reasonableness of AIM's attorney fees and the type of notice required for judicial 
foreclosure, ruling that claim for attorney fees in the prior suit would be allowed to the extent 
they were found to be reasonable, as allowed under the terms of the trust deed (R. at 459). 
At trial, the court determined that the property owners were not entitled to the notices 
required under the note and trust deed as they had not directly assumed the trust deed and 
allowed payment of $17,346.25 of the attorney fees claimed from the prior suit, along with 
attorney fees and costs in the instant case. Also, as AIM had failed to provide billing records as 
6 
requested by Edwards in pretrial discovery, the court denied the admission of AIM's attorney 
billing records for a period of approximately one year prior to the trial (R. at 653). The court 
declined to award AIM certain of its attorney fees requested finding them to have been 
I 
unreasonable and unnecessarily incurred. All amounts awarded by the court were then paid by the 
Edwards to prevent the sale of the property. AIM thereupon appealed the District Court's denial 
of certain fees requested. James Edwards cross appealed seeking reversal of the court's award of 
attorney fees, costs, and interest award by the court in both suits. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 28,1981, James and Beverly Rothey purchased the home located at 
4695 Burch Creek Drive, South Ogden, Utah, and in connection with said purchase signed a note 
and deed of trust in favor of Mountain West Savings and Loan for $79,000.00 (R. at 007 and 
009). Thereafter, on May 30,1985, pursuant to a Revision and Assumption Agreement, the 
Rotheys transferred the property to Michael F. Flynn, who assumed the obligations of the trust 
deed (R. at 013). Thereafter, the lender, Mountain West went into federal receivership and its 
receiver, Resolution Trust Corporation, sold the note and trust deed to the plaintiff, American 
Interstate Mortgage Corporation (hereinafter AIM), on May 2,1991 (R. at 015). 
On July 15,1992, a civil judgment was entered against Michael E. Flynn in the Second 
Judicial District Court of Weber County in favor of Bolt and Nut Supply Company, which 
pursuant to a writ of execution, caused the Weber County Sheriff to levy upon and auction the 
South Ogden home at sheriffs sale on August 18,1992 (R. at 020, 324). Judgment Collection 
Systems, a Utah corporation, was the successful bidder at the sale, and on August 19,1992, 
assigned its interest in the property to James W. Edwards and Helen F. Edwards, husband and 
7 
( 
wife (hereinafter Edwards) (R. at 325). Following the redemption period, a sheriffs deed was 
issued to the Edwards, as joint tenants (Exhibit "D 20"). The Edwards then leased the South 
Ogden home to their son, Bruce Edwards, who has remained in possession thereafter and has at 
all times acted as their authorized agent with respect to the property (R. at 325, 342, and 343). 
A. First Litigation (Bruce C. Edwards vs. American Interstate et al.. Civil 940900438) ' 
Subsequent to the sheriff sale, and consistent with the lease agreement with his parents, 
Bruce Edwards contacted AIM and was informed that the loan payments, costs and late fees were 
i 
delinquent approximately $6400.00. The Edwards then paid these arrears and the Edwards 
commenced making the regular monthly payments required under the note and trust deed to AIM, 
through its servicing agent, First Commerce of America (R. at 327 to 329). Later, AIM * 
discontinued the services of First Commerce and payments were made directly to and accepted 
without protest by AIM (R. at 331 332). AIM became aware of the interest of James and Helen 
< 
Edwards in the property and even introduced the Sheriffs Deed into evidence in the first trial. 
Monthly payments were thereafter made and accepted by AIM until the summer of 
1993, when a dispute arose between Bruce Edwards and AIM regarding missing payments | 
and/or late fees due. After an exchange of correspondence, in February of 1994, AIM demanded 
payment of $2,924.86 and threatened foreclosure. To preclude the loss of the home, Bruce 
4 
Edwards on September 21, 1994, commenced suit in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber 
County, State of Utah, in the matter of Bruce C. Edwards v. American Interstate Mortgage 
Corporation and Douglas M. Durbano, Trustee, Civil No. 940900438, seeking equitable relief ( 
enjoining nonjudicial foreclosure. AIM in turn counterclaimed seeking foreclosure of its trust 
deed and other relief, including attorney fees. On October 4,1994, the District Court granted 
I 
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Edwards' motion for a temporary restraining order enjoining nonjudicial foreclosure and ordered 
Mr. Edwards to tender his monthly loan payments into court. Subsequently, these payments were 
released to AIM pursuant to its motion to the court. 
Later, in the Edwards v. American Interstate case, the lender moved for summary 
judgment allowing its foreclosure of the South Ogden home, and after hearing, the District Court 
denied summary judgment as AIM had failed to give the 30 day notice to cure any claim of 
nonperformnce as required under the terms of the original note. Following several days of trial of 
the issues, the District Court issued its Decision of January 28,1998, finding: 
The court reaches the following conclusions. Mr. Edwards has not made the 
mortgage payments for the months of June and July 1993. To bring the 
account current it is necessary that these two payments be made. Despite the 
mortgage company's numerous errors in determining what specific amounts were 
owed under the note, it would not be fair to simply ignore the clear fact that Mr. 
Edwards did not make these two payments ($605.28 each). 
On the other hand, the mortgage company is not entitled to recover late fees and 
interest on the past due amount. By their own conduct they are precluded as a 
matter of equity from receiving the substantial sums they seek. The record is 
replete with examples of conflicting statements as to what was owed. It would 
be grossly unfair to require Mr. Edwards to pay penalties including interest when 
the demands made upon him were so highly contradictory of each other and 
inconsistent. 
Because the two payments are owed, they are due and payable within 15 days 
from the date of this Order. If they are not paid, then the mortgage company 
is entitled to proceed anew with a foreclosure action (R. at 074). 
While both parties plead and offered proof of significant attorney fees in this litigation, 
none were awarded by the District Court. Further the two payments ($1210.56) were paid within 
the 15 days as ordered by the court. No appeal was taken from this final order. 
9 
B. Instant Litigation 
Following the conclusion of the foregoing litigation, the Edwards fell behind on the 
note payments, and mindful of the notice requirements of the promissory note, AIM sent its 
demand letter of September 16, 1998 to Michael E. Flynn, assignee of the original borrower and 
to the occupant of the South Ogden home (R. at 023). In this notice, wherein the borrower was 
given 30 days to cure, AIM demanded not only payment often months payments totaling 
$7,006.20, but also demanded payment of $19,930.20 together with interest, for attorney fees it 
failed to be awarded in the first suit (R. at 024). Being disputed, the requested attorney fees were 
not paid, but Edwards tendered the missing monthly payments of $7,006.50 by cashier's check to 
the lender on October 23, 1998 (R. at 061 and 062). This check was held by AIM, but uncashed, * 
throughout most of the litigation and later returned to the Edwards. 
On October 28,1998, AIM commenced this action by filing its complaint again seeking to 
judicially foreclose its trust deed as a mortgage. Named as defendant was Bruce C. Edwards, 
the owners' tenant and agent in possession of the property. All other defendants initially joined in 
the action disclaimed any interest in the property or allowed their default to be entered. The only < 
answering defendant, excepting Bruce Edwards, was Ohio Casualty Insurance, which was later 
defaulted owing to non appearance at trial. 
4 
In response to AIM's suit for foreclosure, Bruce Edwards filed his motion to dismiss/ 
summary judgment asserting the bars of res judicata and collateral estoppel to the new attempt 
to recover the attorney fees denied in the previous litigation. After hearing, the District Court, on 4 
March 31,1999, denied dismissal or summary judgment, but ruled that AIM's attempt to recover 
the $19,930.20 in attorney fees from the prior litigation was barred (R. at 099, 169, 205). 
I 
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Specifically, the court stated: 
My opinion is, is if you couldn't collect it directly in a lawsuit brought with 
him and you as a party, and she [Judge Heffernan} does not award it because 
his interest is such it doesn't allow it, I don't see how you can make it a condition 
on him in — in the foreclosure, nor do I see how you can go back now and say, Oh, 
because we had to spend $19,000.00, which we couldn't collect directly from 
him despite the fact we asked Judge Heffernan to, we now want to collect that 
$ 19,000 as part of a separate action. My opinion is, at least in regards to Mr. 
Edwards, you are foreclosed from obtaining — and whether it's collateral 
estoppel — excuse me — collateral estoppel or whether or not it's res judicata, 
I'm of the opinion that that $ 19,000 figure doesn't work (R. at 169). 
Following this order, on July 7,1999, the court directed that James Edwards and Helen 
Edwards, the owners of the South Ogden Home, be joined in the action as parties defendant 
(R. at 235,251). AIM then filed its amended complaint joining James and Helen Edwards. 
As his interest in the subject property was possessory only, the action was later dismissed as 
to Bruce Edwards on March 22,2000 (R. at 451). 
Prior to trial both AIM and Edwards filed cross motions for summary judgment and on 
March 22,2000, after hearing argument on the motions, the District Court denied both motions, 
but ruled that AIM could pursue at trial its previously incurred attorney fee claim against James 
and Helen Edwards, rejecting the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel as to them. 
More particularly, the court narrowed the trial issues to: 
1. The nature and type of notice of default and/or delinquency and opportunity to 
cure that the defendants James and Helen Edwards were entitled to receive and\or 
what notice did they in fact receive. 
2. The reasonableness of costs and attorney fees sought by the plaintiff in this matter 
and in a related matter (R. at 460). 
In preparation for trial, where the overriding issues were liability for and reasonableness 
of AIM's attorney fees, in both a prior case and the instant case, Edwards, on April 9,1999, 
11 
submitted the following along with other discovery requests: 
1. Copies of all documents or other items that the plaintiff intends to introduce into 
evidence upon the trial of the above matter. 
In response to this request, on May 3,1999, AIM stated the following: 
1. Plaintiff has not yet designated documents for trial. Any and all documents which 
Plaintiff intends to introduce into evidence at trial will be timely produced prior to * 
trial. 
After this time, Edwards communicated another discovery request that including, among other 
things, the following request for production of documents: * 
Request No. 7: All time slips, billings, and payment records, along with computer 
records of the same, relative to the preparation, filing, and/or prosecution of the 
present legal action (not to be confused with the companion Judge Heffernan matter) 
(R. at 300). < 
The Edwards' second request for production of documents included, as did the first request, the 
following instruction and admonition: 
' i 
The foregoing requests are continuing in nature and should be supplemented 
with such further answers or documents as the same may become known or 
available to plaintiff or his counsel (R. at 280). 
In response to this request, AIM answered: i 
Response No. 7: Any documents responsive to this request will be produced for 
inspection and copying at a mutually convenient time and place (R. at 300). 
Additionally, AIM enclosed its August 12,1999 letter indicating that its responsive documents < 
were approximately 200 pages and invited Edwards to examine or copy the same. These items 
were then delivered to Edwards for copying (R. at 303). Among the documents delivered were 
the attorney billing statements current through June of 1999. No further billing statements were 
tendered to or received by Edwards until the date of trial, notwithstanding the fact that AIM's 
i 
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counsel prepared and delivered the billings on a monthly basis. Owing to the failure of AIM 
to supplement is discovery with its subsequent monthly attorney billings, at trial the District Court 
disallowed the admission into evidence of monthly billings for the omitted pretrial period of 
July 1999 through June 2000. 
The District Court entered its Findings of Fact, Judgment, and Decree of Foreclosure on 
September 20,2000, awarding AIM a total of $22,163.25 for attorney fees, costs and interest for 
the first lawsuit. Additionally, AIM was awarded $12,488.41 for attorney fees, costs and interest 
in the present action (R. at 652). AIM was denied its claimed attorney fees incurred between July 
of 1999 and June 2000 in the amount of $11,456.95, owing to its failure to provide discovery, 
along with other fees denied by the court. All amounts awarded by the court, including the 
balance owing on the note, were paid and satisfied by the Edwards and received by AIM on 
September 27,2000 (R. at 696). 
On October 20,2000, AIM filed its Notice of Appeal from the court's denial of certain 
attorney fees and costs (R. at 677). James Edwards cross appealed, filing his Notice of Appeal on 
November 1, 2000, contesting the trial court's allowance of attorney fees and costs from the prior 
and present litigation. 
James Edwards died on November 14, 2000. Bruce Edwards was appointed personal 
representative of the Estate of James Wesley Edward by order of the Second Judicial District 
Court of Davis County, State of Utah, Probate No. 003700376, January 22,2001. The Utah 
Supreme Court ordered that Bruce Edwards be substituted for the decedent James Edwards 
pursuant to the parties' stipulation on February 8,2001. Helen Edwards predeceasing her 
husband, had died shortly before the appeal was taken. 
13 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The promissory note of August 28, 1981, requires that the borrower be given notice 
of any delinquency and a 30 day period to cure as a precondition to accelerating the maturity of 
the note. Since the lender failed to provided an effective notice that allowed the time within 
which to cure, it was not entitled to accelerate the note and commence foreclosure. 
II. The trust deed of August 28,1981 specifically requires that the lender give advance 
notice to the borrower of its intention to incur attorney fees and other costs for the protection of 
its interests in the security. The giving of such advance notice was a prerequisite to its entitlement 
to recover such costs and fees. Since the lender failed to give such notice, it is now precluded 
from recovering such expenses. 
III. In an earlier lawsuit in the District Court of Weber County between Bruce Edwards 
and AIM, the lender sought and was denied and equitably estopped from recovering $19,930.20 in 
attorney fees, part of which it was awarded in the instant case. It was error for the trial court to 
make such an award as this claim was barred by the doctrines of res judicata, issue preclusion, 
collateral estoppel or equitable estoppel. 
IV. During pretrial discovery, the Edwards requested the production of AIM's attorney 
billing records. AIM responded indicating that it would furnish all records that it intended to use 
at trial to the Edwards "prior to trial." Also, the trial court entered an order compelling discovery 
of such documents and the Edwards again made a new request for the records with a second 
request that records be updated and supplemented as new billings became available. When it 
appeared at trial that AIM had failed to produce its billing records from June 30,1999 to July of 
2000, the court properly disallowed the introduction of such items into evidence. The court's 
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refusal to allow the introduction of such records was proper under either the present Rule 26(e), 
or an earlier version of Rule 26(e). 
V. AIM argues in its brief that the present version of Rule 26(e) does not apply to this 
case due to the effective date of the amendments. This issue was never presented to the trial 
court for its determination and therefore preserved in the trial record, and cannot now be raised 
for the first time on appeal. 
VI. AIM maintains in its brief that Bruce Edwards and/or James Edwards lack standing 
to bring this appeal or oppose AIM's appeal, even though James and Helen Edwards were the 
owners of the South Ogden home held as security under AIM's trust deed. AIM had actual 
knowledge of their interest and even introduced the Sheriff s's Deed under which they acquired 
the property in the first lawsuit. Further, pursuant to the order of the court, AIM joined James 
and Helen Edwards as defendants in this action. James and Helen are now both deceased and 
Bruce Edwards has been appointed by the District Court of Davis County, Utah, as personal 
representative of the Estate of James Edwards. The trial court therefore properly rejected this 
claim prior to the trial. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
FORECLOSURE IS NOT AVAILABLE AS A REMEDY UNTIL THE 
» PROPER NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO CURE IS GIVEN 
In this action, AIM commenced the second lawsuit to judicially foreclose its trust deed 
as a mortgage as statutorily allowed under Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-23, which allows this 
procedure "at the option of the beneficiary," This approach has been specifically approved by the 
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Utah Supreme Court. Security Title Co. v. Payless Builder's Supply, 407 P.2d 141 (Utah 1965). 
In such an lawsuit, the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the action are governed by the 
note and trust deed purchased by AIM. These two instruments constitute the contract documents 
and must be read together in determining whether an acceleration provision is applicable. 
American Savings & Loan Assoc, v. Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1 (Utah 1968). Further, while a secured 
party is generally not required to give notice of default and time to cure before exercising an 
acceleration option contained in the mortgage, it must do so when contractually required. 
Johnston v. Austin, 748 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988). 
In this case, the trust deed note purchased by AIM and secured by the deed of trust on 
the Edwards home contains, in paragraph 6, the following language: 
6. BORROWERS'S FAILURE TO PAY AS REQUIRED 
(B) Notice from Note Holder 
If I do not pay the fall amount of each monthly payment on time, 
the Note Holder may send me a written notice telling me that if I do 
not pay the overdue amount by a certain date I will be in default. 
That date must be at least 30 days after the date on which the 
notice is mailed to me. 
(C) Default 
If I do not pay the overdue amount by the date stated in the notice 
described in (B) above, I will be in default. If I am in default, the 
Note Holder may require me to pay immediately the fall amount of 
principal which has not been paid and all the interest that I owe on 
that amount. 
Accordingly, the obligor under the note is entitled to advance notice of any claimed 
deficiency with a corresponding opportunity to cure within a 30 day period. Such notice is a 
precondition to advancing the maturity of the note. Unless and until the notice is given, the note 
holder is not entitled to the remedy of foreclosure, since "the objective of the notice requirements 
is to protect the rights of those with an interest in the property to sold." Occidental/Nebraska 
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Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Jones vs. Johnson, 761 
P.2d37(UtahCt.App.l998). 
Clearly, AIM was aware of this notice requirement when its counsel mailed his default 
letter of September 16,1998. This correspondence was furnished to the original note obligor and 
to Bruce Edwards as the occupant of the property. The notice detailed the delinquent monthly 
payments needed to cure, but also went on to wrongfully require performance not due under 
the contract documents, namely, the following: 
That the lenders security or interest in the property has become impaired due to 
the bankruptcy of the debtor, abandonment of the property by the debtor, legal 
actions filed by Bruce Edwards against the lender relating to his possessory 
interest in the subject property requiring Lender, pursuant to 6(D) and 7 of the 
Trust deed, to make disbursements including costs and reasonable attorney fees 
in the amount of $19,930.20 to protect Lender's interest. This amount is hereby 
declared due and payable within (30) days of the date of this notice, plus interest 
thereon at the rate payable on the outstanding principal under the Note. 
The claimed $19,930.20 was, of course, the same attorney fees and costs that AIM sought 
unsuccessfully from the District Court in the first litigation with Bruce Edwards, and from 
which judgment AIM did not appeal. Nevertheless, under this notice, for the property owners, 
James and Helen Edwards, to cure, they would have to pay the missing payments and also pay the 
disputed attorney fees and costs earlier denied by the first court. Furthermore, the amount 
claimed ($19,930.20) even exceeded the amount ultimately allowed by the District Court in this 
litigation ($17346.25 with interest). The default notice, demanding considerably greater payments 
than allowed under the note, was accordingly defective in a material manner. Such a notice 
effectively denied the property owners of their right and opportunity to cure the default. As a 
proper notice was never provided, AIM was not entitled to accelerate the maturity of the debt and 
IT 
i 
proceed with the remedy of foreclosure. 
POINTII
 { 
ATTORNEY FEES ARE NOT AVAILABLE UNDER THE TRUST DEED 
UNLESS THE SECURED PARTY FURNISHES THE NOTICE 
REQUIRED BY THE TRUST DEED 
Paragraph 7 of the August 28, 1981, trust deed provides the secured party with the 
following remedies: 
7. Protection of Lender's Security. If Borrower fails to perform the covenants and 
agreements contained in this Deed of Trust, or if any action or proceeding is 
commenced which materially affects Lender's interest in the Property, including 
but not limited to eminent domain, insolvency, code enforcement, or arrangements 
or proceedings involving a bankrupt or decedent, then Lender at Lender's option 
upon notice to Borrower, may make such appearances, disburse such sums and 
take such action as is necessary to protect Lender's interest, including, but not 
limited to, disbursement of reasonable attorney's fees . . .(Emphasis added). 
Similar to the default provisions of the promissory note, the trust deed requires as a 
precondition to incurring costs and attorney fees, that AIM, as the secured party, give prior * 
notice to the borrower. The obvious purpose of this notice requirement is to allow the borrower 
an opportunity to eliminate the default or resolve the threat to the lender's security. As 
( 
previously noted by this court, such "detailed procedural requirements for a trustee's sale of real 
property are intended to protect the debtor/trustor" or those with an interest in the property to be 
sold. Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah Ct.App.1988). See Occidental/Nebraska < 
Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
Contrary to the requirements of the foregoing trust deed provisions, AIM never gave any 
advance notice to the note maker, subsequent assignee, or the property owners prior to engaging 
legal counsel and incurring the attorney fees and costs in the first lawsuit. In fact, it was 
i 
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this failure that led the trial court in the first case to deny AIM the right to foreclose, judicially or 
otherwise. More importantly, these attorney fees were incurred by AIM as a consequence of 
its own wrongful threats of foreclosure and in otherwise threatening or seeking relief to which 
it was not legally entitled. As held by the trial court, the necessity of the litigation was in large 
part due to the lender's highly "contradictory and inconsistent" demands. AIM was therefore 
equitably estopped by its own misconduct from recovering the late fees, interest and fees it 
sought. Accordingly, having failed to comply with the notice requirements of its own trust deed, 
AIM cannot now be allowed to recover attorney fees it claims to have incurred in protecting its 
security. It cannot claim the benefits of the contract provision (Paragraph 7) while at the same 
time ignoring the burdens it imposes. 
POINTIII 
THE CLAIM FOR $19,930.20 IN ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS IS 
BARRED BY THE DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA, COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL, AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
In the earlier case of Bruce Edwards v. American Interstate Mortgage, Mr. Edwards, 
individually and as managing agent for his parents, commenced suit to restrain the nonjudicial 
trust deed sale of the South Ogden home and property in which he had a possessory interest, as 
lessee. Essentially treating him as the property owner, as it long had during his performance of 
the note and trust deed, AIM counterclaimed for the judicial foreclosure of its trust deed, also 
seeking its court costs and attorney fees incurred in that proceeding. That case involved the same 
parties as initially joined in the instant case. It involved the same note and trust deed and the same 
real property. In its Answer and Counterclaim, AIM specifically prayed for "[defendant's costs 
and attorney's fees in defending the Complaint," and for "collection costs, reasonable attorney's 
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fees and costs of court herein." At trial, AIM made a proffer of its attorney fees and sought the 
introduction of evidence as to its attorney fees and costs, as did Mr. Edwards. In its final 
decision, however, the District Court awarded attorney fees to neither party. No appeal was 
taken from this ruling. 
As with attorney fees, the trial court denied AIM late fees and interest claimed under the 
note and trust deed, specifically holding: 
By their conduct they [AIM] are precluded as a matter of equity from receiving the 
substantial sums they seek. The record is replete with examples of conflicting 
statements as to what was owed. It would be grossly unfair to require Mr. Edwards 
to pay penalties including interest when the demands made upon him were so highly 
contradictory of each other and inconsistent (Emphasis added). 
Basically, the trial court found that AIM was equitably estopped by its own misconduct from 
recovering the substantial sums sought as interest, late fees, attorney fees, or other relief. The 
question of AIM's entitlement to attorney fees and costs incurred in that proceeding is therefore 
now barred by the doctrines of equitable estoppel, res judicata, issue preclusion or collateral 
estoppel. 
These doctrines serve the important public policy of providing finality to the judicial < 
process by preventing previously litigated issues and claims from being relitigated. Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1966); Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 
1178 (Utah 1993). See also Berry v. Berry 738 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct.App.1987); and Estate of 
Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct.App. 1995). 
In the 1996 case of Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996) the Utah Supreme Court ( 
reaffirmed the four requirements previously set forth in Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 
669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983) that must be met for the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue 
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preclusion to apply: 
First, the issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must be 
final with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, fairly, 
and competently litigation in the first action. Fourth, the party who is precluded 
from litigating the issue must be either a party to the first action or a privy of a 
party. Penrod at 875. 
Sevy v. Security Title Co., 903 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995); Maoris & Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc. 
986 P.2d 748 (Utah Ct.App. 1999). 
In applying the Penrod criteria to the fact of this case, it will be seen that in both the prior 
action and the suit now on appeal, the identical issue is AIM's entitlement to recover its attorney 
fees and costs. Final judgment was entered in the District Court which denied these fees. The 
matter of attorney fees was litigated in the first case and the parties both had a full and fair 
opportunity to try that claim. Lastly, the party to be precluded from relitigating the attorney 
fee issue, American Interstate Mortgage, was an adverse party in both suits. As all the necessary 
requirements are fully met, the fee issue is now precluded and AIM is collaterally estopped from 
reasserting it in a separate action. See Richards v. Hodson, 485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971); 
Progressive Acquisition Inc., v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
Similar to the doctrine of collateral estoppel is that of res judicata, which bars the 
relitigation of certain claims. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Schaer v. State ex rel. 
UDOT, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), reaffirming Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 
1978): 
In order for res judicata to apply, both suits must involve the same parties or their 
privies and also the same cause of action: and this precludes relitigation of all issues 
that could have been litigated as well as those that were in fact litigated in the prior 
action. Schafer 1340. 
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Similarly, this court detailed these requirements in Am. Estate Mgt. v. Intern. Inv. & Dev., 
986 P.2d 765 (Utah Ct.App.1999) as follows: 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only if the suit in which that cause of 
action is being asserted and the prior suit satisfy three requirements. First, 
both cases must involve the same parties, or their privies. Second, the claim that 
is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be one 
that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit 
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Applying the foregoing criteria it will be seen that both cases involved the same parties or 
their privies. AIM was a party in each action, as was Bruce Edwards. Further, Bruce Edwards 
was at all times the tenant in possession and management agent for James and Helen Edwards. 
By court order he now acts as personal representative for the estate of his late father and has been 
appointed as substitute party in this appeal. Further, the cause of action for attorney fees, is the 
same in both lawsuits. Lastly, the issue of attorney fees could have been and was litigated in the 
prior action, and that prior action resulted in a final judgment. In re J J. T., 877 P.2d 161 (Utah { 
Ct.App.1994); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988); Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork 
Pipeline Corporation, 913 P.2d 731 (Utah 1995). See also, PGM, Inc., v. Westchester 
( 
Investment Partners, Ltd., 995 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct.App.2000); Collins v. Sandy City Board of 
Adjustment, 16 P.3d 1251 (Utah Ct.App.2000). 
The same equitable considerations presently apply in the instant case that the trial court < 
found to have equitably estopped AIM from obtaining the relief it sought, namely, the repeated 
conflicting statements, requests, and demands upon the homeowner that "were so highly 
contradictory of each other and inconsistent." 
Accordingly, under the long recognized principles of equitable estoppel, res judicata, issue 
< 
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preclusion or collateral estoppel, AIM is now estopped and precluded from again litigating the 
attorney fees and costs it expended in the initial suit. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF 
ATTORNEY FEES FOR THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY 
WAS WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT 
During the pretrial discovery period in this action, Edwards submitted certain discovery 
requests to AIM on April 9,1999, consisting of a request for production of documents and 
interrogatories. Among other items, Edwards requested the following: 
1. Copies of all documents or other items that the plaintiff intends to introduce into 
evidence upon the trial of the above matter. 
This discovery request ended with the request "The foregoing requests are continuing in nature 
and should be updated as future circumstances may require (Emphasis added). In response to 
this request, AIM responded on May 3,1999, as follows: 
1. Plaintiff has not yet designated documents for trial. Any and all documents which 
Plaintiff intends to introduce into evidence at trial will be timely produced prior 
to trial (Emphasis added). 
Believing this and other responses to discovery to be insufficient and inadequate, Edwards filed 
his motion to compel discovery and following a hearing on July 7,1999, the District Court 
entered the following discovery order: 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that the plaintiff 
shall be and is hereby ordered to fully answer and comply with the defendant's 
Request for Production of Documents and Interrogatories served by defendant 
Edwards on or about the 9th of April, 1999, in the above matter. Specifically, 
the plaintiff shall answer and comply with paragraphs 1 , . . . [quoted above] 
(Emphasis added). 
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Owing to the inadequacy AIM's initial response to discovery, the court went on the enter the 
further order: 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that the trial date 
heretofore set in the matter for the 27th of July, 1999, shall be and is hereby 
stricken. The matter shall not be reset for trial until discovery by the parties has 
been completed and additional parties have been properly joined consistent with 
this order. 
Following the entry of this order, Edwards again on July 7, 1999, sent AIM the following 
additional interrogatories and requests for production of documents: 
7. All time slips, billings, and payment records, along with computer records of the 
same, relating to the preparation, filing, and/or prosecution of the present legal 
action (not to be confused with the companion Judge Heffernan matter). 
8. All documents that the plaintiff or his counsel intend to introduce into evidence at ' 
the trial of the matter, not previously furnished to defendant as part of the court 
order compelling discovery. 
Again the discovery ended with the admonition and request: 
The foregoing request are continuing in nature and should be supplemented 
with such further answers or documents as the same may become known or 
available to plaintiff or his counsel (Emphasis added). 
Thereafter, on August 12,1999, in response the court's order compelling discovery, AIM made 
the following response to Edwards' initial request: 
1. All documents responsive to this request will be produced at a mutually convenient 
time and place for inspection and copying. 
On the same date, AIM responded to Edwards' follow-up discovery requests with the 
following: 
7. Any documents responsive to this request will be produced for inspection and 
copying at a mutually convenient time and place. 
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8. Any documents responsive to this request will be produced for inspection and 
copying at a mutually convenient time and place. 
Subsequent to the above exchange, and pursuant to its August 12,1999 letter, AIM delivered to 
Edwards a large number of documents for inspection and copying. These documents included 
copies of the computer billing statements of AIM's counsel as prepared and delivered to the 
client on a monthly basis. Such billings were current through June of 1999. Even though the 
monthly billings of AIM's counsel were supplied to it regularly each month, no further records 
were furnished to Edwards nor made available to him until the morning of trial, July 18,2000. 
As a consequence of the foregoing, and upon Edwards' objection, the trial court denied the 
admission of a number of AIM's attorney billing records subsequent to June 30,1999. 
Rule 26(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a reasonable construction of the 
court's order compelling discovery, and AIM's own answer required that AIM update its 
response by making its billing records available to Edwards in a timely manner. As noted, in its 
initial response, AIM specifically stated that any documents it intended to use at trial "will be 
timely produce prior to trial." 
Rule 26(e) provides the following: 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under 
subdivision (a) or responded to a request for discovery with a response is under a 
duty to supplement the disclosure or response to include information thereafter 
acquired if ordered by the court or in the following circumstances: 
(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under 
Subdivision (a) if the party learn that in some material respect the information 
disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information 
has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery 
process or in writing. With respect to testimony of an expert witness from whom a 
report is required under Subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty extends both to information 
contained in the report and to information provided through a deposition of the 
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expert. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory,
 { 
request for production, or request for admission if the party leans that the response 
is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or 
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties 
during the discovery process or in writing. 
In the pretrial discovery process, Edwards asked on two separate occasions for the 
documents that AIM intended to use as exhibits at trial, on each instance requesting the response 
be updated. Upon AIM's initial refusal to provide these documents, the court ordered that AIM 
"fully answer and comply" with this request. Since the basic thrust of the action was the recovery 
of attorney fees in the instant and past case, it must have been obvious to AIM that it would seek 
the introduction and use at trial of its attorney billing statements. Failure to provide them as they 
were produced violated not only the express provisions of Rule 26(e), U.R.C.P., but also the 
order of the court. 
Furthermore, even if a prior version of Rule 26(e), URCP applied to this action, the court 
properly excluded the use at trial of the documents and exhibits not furnished in discovery. It 
will be noted that the earlier version of the rule provides as follows: ' 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a request for 
discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no duty to 
supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, except as 
follows: ( 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he 
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the 
response was incorrect when made, or (B) he known that the 
response through correct when made is no longer true and the 
circumstances are such that a failure to amend the response is in 
substance a knowing concealment. 
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the 
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court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial 
through new requests for supplementation of prior responses 
(Emphasis added). 
Here, as each month went by, a new billing statement was prepared and presented to AIM 
by its counsel for which it intended to seek recovery at trial. AIM had the responsibility even 
under the earlier version of Rule 26(e), U.R.C.P. to make new computer billings available to the 
adverse party to update and correct the amount of fees it would ultimately seek at trial. 
Additionally, AIM was under a specific order of the court to "folly answer and comply" with 
Edwards' requests, as detailed in subparagraph (3) above and Edwards had made a " request for 
supplementation of prior responses" in the initial request of April 9, 1999. Again, on July 7, 
1999, some three months later and a foil year before the trial, Edwards made the second and a 
"new request" for the supplementation of discovery. Owing to AIM's failure to have provided 
the material ordered and requested, the court acted within its sound discretion in denying AIM's 
request to introduce into evidence material not furnished. Such action is specifically authorized 
under Rule 37(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part: 
If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including 
an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule . . . the court in which the 
action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and 
among others the following: 
(B) an order . . . prohibiting him from introducing designated matters 
in evidence (Emphasis added). 
POINT V 
AIM RAISES THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENTS TO RULE 26(e) FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
Interestingly, AIM asserts that the existing provisions of Rule 26(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not apply to this case as the action was filed prior to November 1,1999, 
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but tried in July of 2000. A review of the trial record will demonstrate, however, that AIM 
never urged at trial or brought to the trial court's attention the effective date of the amendments 
to Rule 26(e), but raises this issue for the first time on appeal. 
During the trial, Edwards objected to the introduction of AIM's attorney billing records for 
he reasons noted above. In response to the objection, AIM's counsel stated: 
If he really had an issue with that, I think that he should have at least called or 
dropped a letter or something, and we would have been more than happy to send 
these off whenever he asked. It's something that- - like I said, I didn't go through 
the file again and review all of this discovery requests. (T. at 73). { 
Never did AIM argue or suggest that it had no duty to furnish discovery under one version of the 
rule or another. Never did it maintain that one version applied rather than another. At no time 
was the trial court given any opportunity to consider this argument or request. 
Under such circumstances, this court has repeatedly held: 
It is axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial court may not be raised { 
for the first time on appeal. Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 
1040,1044 (Utah 1983), quoted with approval in Progressive Acquisition, Inc. 
v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239,242 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). 
Again, this court has observed: < 
We are governed by the general principle that we may not address issues that are 
raised for the first time on appeal. Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 
376, 378 (Utah Ct.App.1993) quoting with approval Ong intern. (U.S.A.) v. 11th 
Ave Corp., 850 P.2d 447,455 (Utah 1993) ("Failure to raise the point [below] 1 
precludes its consideration here."). 
Accordingly, since the District Court was never asked to consider the effective date of the recent 
amendments to Rule 26(e), U.R.C.P., or the amendments applicability to this action, it would < 
violate fundamental principles of appellate review to consider it here. 
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ISSUE VI 
THE ESTATE OF JAMES EDWARDS AS OWNER OF THE REAL 
PROPERTY HAS PROPER STANDING TO DEFEND THE FORECLOSURE 
AND TO BRING THIS APPEAL 
As noted in the Certificate of Sale (Exhibit D21), Michael Flynn's interest in the South 
Ogden home and real property was sold at sheriffs sale on August 18,1992. Judgment 
Collection Systems, a Utah corporation, was the successful bidder at the sale. After the 
redemption period, the property was assigned and transferred to James W. Edwards and Helen F. 
Edwards, as joint tenants, by the Sheriffs Deed (Exhibit D20). AIM was well aware of the 
interest of James and Helen and had actual knowledge of their interest as it had received 
numerous monthly payments from this. Further, AIM even introduced into evidence the Sheriffs 
Deed under which their ownership interest arose in the first lawsuit between Bruce Edwards and 
AIM. Because of their ownership interest in the property, being well known to AIM in both the 
prior and the present litigation, the trial court granted their motion to intervene finding them to be 
the real parties in interest and their presence in the action being necessary to a full and just 
adjudication of the claims pursuant to Rules 17 and 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Mr. James Edwards acquired the interest of his wife, the joint tenant, upon her death, by 
operation of law, and was therefore the sole owner of the real property upon his death November 
14, 2000, subject to the trust deed and other claims of record. On January 22,2001 the Second 
Judicial District Court of Davis County, State of Utah, in the Matter of the Estate of James 
Wesley Edwards, Probate No. 003700376 duly admitted his last will to probate and appointed 
Bruce Edwards as personal representative of the estate. Thereafter, and upon written stipulation 
of the parties, on February 8,2001, the Utah Supreme Court entered its order pursuant to Rule 
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25, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, substituting Bruce Edwards in place of the decedent. 
Based on the foregoing it is rather difficult to understand the claim made that the Estate of , 
James Edwards lacks standing to bring or oppose this appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The rights and interests of American Interstate Mortgage Company arise under the terms 
and conditions of a promissory note and deed of trust that it purchased from the federal receiver 
of Mountain West Savings and Loan. Under the terms of the promissory note, AIM was 
obligated to provide the borrower with advance notice of any nonperformance and a 30 day 
opportunity to cure. Under the terms of the deed of trust, AIM was required to give advance 
notice to the borrower of its intention to incur and pay attorney fees and other costs as a ( 
precondition to recovering these expenses. Having failed to give the notices required under the 
contract documents, AIM is precluded from the remedy of judicial foreclosure and is not entitled 
to recover its attorney fees or costs from the prior or the present lawsuit. It was therefore error 
for the District Court to allow judicial foreclosure and to have awarded attorney fees from the 
past or present litigation. The Judgment of the District Court allowing foreclosure and awarding 
costs and attorney fees should therefore be reversed, and the claim dismissed. 
In an earlier lawsuit to which AIM was a party defendant and counterclaiming, it sought 
attorney fees and costs along with the judicial foreclosure of its security. In that action, the trial 
court denied the remedy of foreclosure, denied AIM its attorney fees, costs and other relief 
finding that it was equitably estopped by its own conduct from recovering the substantial sums 
that it sought. No appeal was taken from that final judgment. As a consequence, AIM is now 
precluded by the long recognized doctrines of res judicata, issue preclusion, collateral estoppel 
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and equitable estoppel from recovering these sums in the subsequent lawsuit. Accordingly, it was 
error for the trial court to have awarded any portion of AIM's costs and attorney fees from the 
prior lawsuit, and the District Court's Judgment granting these attorney fees and costs should be 
reversed, and the claim dismissed. 
During the trial below, the District Court properly denied the admission of certain attorney 
billing records of AIM owing to its violation of an order compelling discovery and AIM's own 
response to discovery, indicating that it would produce such documents prior to trial. Therefore 
the trial court's action was proper under an earlier or present version of Rule 26(e). Moreover, as 
AIM never raised that issue at trial it cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal. The trial 
court's order denying admissibility of these should therefore Jzfe affirmed 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of July, 200 L 
^KJ^qWLTON 
fttttfrne/for Bruce Edwards, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of James Edwards 
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ADDENDUM 
I 
A. Note of August 28,1981 
B. Deed of Trust of August 28, 1981 
C. Decisionof January 28,1998 
D. Judgment and Order (Compelling Discovery) of July 26,1999 
E. Certificate of Sale 
F. Sheriffs Deed 
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Tab A 
rNUXJHi - ' • ' / 
NOTICE TO BORROWER:. THIS NOtE CONTAINS A PROVISION ALLOWING FOR 
CHANGES IN THE INTEREST RATE. INCREASES IN THE INTEREST RATE WILL 
RESULT IN HIGHER PAYMENTS. DECREASES IN THE INTEREST RATE WILL 
RESULT IN LOWER PAYMENTS. 
AUGUST. 28JH 19.8.1 OGDEN UTAH 
City State 
4695. BURCH. CREEK.DRIVE.. .SOUTH .OGDEN UTAH 84403 
Property Address City State Zip Code 
1. BORROWER'S PROMISE TO PAY 
In return for a loan that I have received, I promise to pay US $.79»Q0Qi0Q (this amount will be 
called "principal"), plus interest, to the order of the Lender. The Lender is 
. .MQ.UNTAJWWWJ.?AVIN.Q5.ANP.WAN 
I understand that the Lender may transfer this Note. The Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer and 
who is entitled to receive payments under this Note will be called the "Note Holder". 
2. INTEREST 
Interest will be charged on that part of principal which has not been paid. Interest will be charged beginning on the 
date of this Note and continuing until the full amount of principal has been paid. 
Starting on the date of this Note, I will pay interest at a yearly rate of . . . 12.-1./? % (the "Initial Interest 
Rate"). The interest rate that I will pay will change in accordance with Section 5 of this Note until my loan is paid. In-
terest rate changes may occur on the .. .1ST.. day of FEBRUARY in 1985. . . and on that 
day in that month every . . . . THREE. (3 ) years thereafter (the "Change Date"). 
The interest rate that I pay will not be changed by more than .!.«$ percentage points on any Change Date. 
The interest rate that I pay may never be increased to more than .1.7?J/2. % or decreased to less than 7."'./?.. % 
during the period I have my loan. 
3. THIS NOTE SECURED BY A DEED OF TRUST 
In addition to the protections given to the Note Holder under this Note, a Deed of Trust, dated 
AUGUST. .?8J.H , 19.81 . . , protects the Note Holder from possible losses which might result if I 
do not keep the promises which I make in this Note. That Deed of Trust describes how and under what conditions I 
may be required to make immediate payment in full of all amounts that I owe under this Note. 
4. PAYMENTS 
(A) Time and Place of Payments 
I will pay principal and interest by making payments every month. I will make my monthly payments on the 
.1ST. day of each month beginning on .OCTOBER. 1ST .,19.8.1. . . . I will make my monthly 
payments at . . . .240.6. .WASHINGTON .BOULEVARD., .06D£N,. UTAH.. 84401 
or at a different place if required by the Note Holder. I will make these payments until I have paid all of the principal 
and interest and any other charges, described below, that I may owe under this Note. I will pay all sums that I owe 
under this Note no later than . .SEPTEMBER .1ST 20.11 . . (the "final payment date"). 
(B) Borrower's Payments Before They Are Due 
I have the right to make payments of principal at any time before they are due. A payment of principal only is 
known as a "prepayment". When I make a prepayment, I will tell the Note Holder in a letter that I am doing so. I may 
make a full prepayment or a partial prepayment without paying any penalty. The Note Holder will use all of my 
prepayments to reduce the amount of principal that I owe under this Note. If I make a partial prepayment, there will be 
no delays in the due dates of my monthly payments unless the Note Holder agrees in writing to those delays. My partial 
prepayment will reduce the amount of my monthly payments after the first Change Date following my partial prepay-
ment. However, any reduction due to my partial prepayment may be offset by an interest rate increase. 
(C) Amount of Monthly Payments 
My initial monthly payments will be in the amount of US $. 843 • 14 If the interest rate that 
I pay changes, the amount of my monthly payments will change. Increases in the interest rate will result in higher 
payments (unless my prepayments since the last Change Date offset the increases in my monthly payments). Decreases 
in the interest rate will result in lower payments. The amount of my monthly payments will always be sufficient to repay 
my loan in full in substantially equal payments by the final payment date. In setting the monthly payment amount on 
each Change Date, the Note Holder will assume that the Note interest rate will not change again prior to the final pay-
ment date. 
5. INTEREST RATE CHANGES 
(A) The Index 
Any changes in the interest rate will be based on changes in a measure of the cost of home mortgage loans 
called the "Index". The Index is the "Contract Interest Rate, Purchase of Previously Occupied Homes, National 
Average for all Major Types of Lenders" made available by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. If the Index ceases to 
be made available by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, or by any successor to it, (he Note Holder will set the Note 
interest rate by using a comparable national index. 
(B) Setting the New Interest Rate 
To set the new interest rate, the Note Holder will first determine a "preliminary rate". The preliminary 
rate will reflect the change between the most recent Index figure available on . . . JULY. 3.15T , 19. 6.1.. 
(the "Base Index figure") and the most recent Index figure available on the .3QTHday of 
SEPTEMBER . .prior to each Change Date (the "current Index figure"). 
If the current Index figure is larger than the Base Index figure, the Note Holder will add the amount of the 
change to the Initial Interest Rate. If the current Index figure is smaller than the Base Index figure, the Note Holder will 
subtract the amount of the change from the Initial Interest Rate. The result of this addition or subtraction will be the 
preliminary rate. If there is no change between the Base Index figure and the current Index figure, the Initial Interest 
Rate will be the preliminary rate. 
Next, the Note Holder will adjust the preliminary rate so that: 
(i) the change in the interest rate on any Change Date will not be more than . 1 . 5 . percentage points; and 
(ii) the new interest rate will not be more than . 5 ,0 . percentage points higher or lower than the Initial 
Interest Rate. 
(C) Effective Date of Changes ,,, «x* 
feach new interest rate will become effective on the next Change Date. If my monthly payment changes as a 
result of a change in the interest rate, my monthly payment will change as of the first monthly payment date after the 
Change Date. 
(D) Notice to Borrower 
The Note Holder will mail me a notice by first class mail (which may be certified) at least 90 days before each 
Change Date during the period I have my loan. The notice will include: 
(i) a statement that my loan interest rate is scheduled to be adjusted on the next Change Date; 
(ii) a statement that if I do not pay my loan in full by the next Change Date, the interest rate on my loan 
will be adjusted; 
(iii) the interest rate that will apply to my loan for the period beginning with the next Change Date; 
(iv) the amount of my monthly payment of principal and interest after the next Change Date; 
(v) the date of my first monthly payment after the next Change Date; 
(vi) a statement of what the principal balance of my loan will be on the next Change Date assuming I make 
my regular monthly payments; 
(vii) a reminder that there is no penalty if I pay off my entire loan or a part of it on the next Change Date or 
at any other time; and, 
(viii) the title and telephone number of an employee who will answer my questions regarding the notice. 
6. BORROWER'S FAILURE TO PAY AS REQUIRED 
(A) Late Charge for Overdue Payments 
If the Note Holder has not received the full amount of any of my monthly payments by the end of .15 
calendar days after the date it is due, I will pay a late charge to the Note Holder. The amount of the charge will be 
. 4 . 0 - . . Vo of my overdue payment of principal and interest. I will pay this late charge only once on any late payment. 
(B) Notice from Note Holder 
If I do not pay the full amount ofreaflLmonthly payment on time, the Note Holder may send me a written 
notice telling me that if I do not pay the ovfajue. afmuint by a certain date I will be in default. That date must be at least 
30 days after the date on which the notice ^ hia/leiHto me. 
(C) Default ^ ^ J ^ 
If I do not pay the overdue amount byfrife\rfj^stated in the notice described in (B) above, I will be in default. 
If I am in default, the Note Holder may require m«w$fiWmmediately the full amount of principal which has not been 
paid and all the interest that I owe on that amount. &\0foL. 
Even if, at a time when I am in default, the4*ote HJjgjJer does not require me to pay immediately in full as 
described above, the Note Holder will still have the right Jg^oo^^if I am in default at a later time. 
(D) Payment of Note Holder's Costs and ExpensesV\^$ 
If the Note Holder has required me to pay immediaUd$Mr™l as described above, the Note Holder will have 
the right to be paid back by me for all its reasonable costs and cranises to the extent not prohibited by applicable law. 
Those expenses may include, for example, reasonable attorneys fees. 
7. WAIVERS 
Anyone who signs this Note to transfer it to someone else (known as an "endorser") waives certain rights. Those 
rights are (A) the right to require the Note Holder to demand payment of amounts due (known as "presentment") and 
(B) the right to require the Note Holder to give notice that amounts due have not been paid (known as "notice of 
dishonor"). 
8. GIVING OF NOTICES 
Except for the notice provided in Section 5(D), any notice that must be given to me under this Note will be given by 
mailing it by certified mail. All notices will be addressed to me at the Property Address above. Notices will be mailed to 
me at a different address if I give the Note Holder a notice of my different address. 
Any notice that must be given to the Note Holder under this Note will be given by mailing it by certified mail to the 
Note Holder at the address stated in Section 4(A) above. Notices will be mailed to the Note Holder at a different address 
if I am given a notice of that different address. 
9. RESPONSIBILITY OF PERSONS UNDER THIS NOTE 
If more than one person signs this Note, each of us is fully and personally obligated to pay the full amount owed 
and to keep all of the promises made in this Note. Any guarantor, surety, or endorser of this Note is also obligated to do 
these things. The Note Holder may enforce its rights under this Note against each of us individually or against all of us 
together. This means that any one of us may be required to pay all of the amounts owed under this Note. 
Any person who takes over my rights or obligations under this Note will have all of my rights and must keep all of 
my promises made in this Note. Any person who takes over the rights or obligations of a guarantor, surety, or endorser 
of this Note is also obligated to keep all of the promises made in this Note. 
10. LOAN CHARGES 
It could be that this loan is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges and that law is interpreted so that the 
interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with this loan would exceed permitted limits. If 
this is the case, then: (A) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to the per-
mitted limit; and (B) any sums already collected from me Which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to me. The 
Note Holder may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal I owe under this Note or by making a direct pay-
ment to me. If a refund reduces principal, the reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment. 
/foi*1<<44.,. ^7/.... ^aO&^hL/zf' (Seal) 
.(Seal) 
Borrower 
(Sign Original Only) 
(Seal) 
RIDER 
NOTICE: THE SECURITY INSTRUMENT SECURES A NOTE WHICH CONTAINS 
A PROVISION ALLOWING FOR CHANGES IN THE INTEREST RATE. IN-
CREASES IN THE INTEREST RATE WILL RESULT IN HIGHER PAYMENTS. 
DECREASES IN THE INTEREST RATE WILL RESULT IN LOWER PAYMENTS. 
This Rider is made this .28TH . . day of AUGUST , 19.81 . . , and is incorporated into and shall 
be deemed to amend and supplement the Mortgage, Deed of Trust, or Deed to Secure Debt (the "Security Instru-
ment") of the same date given by the undersigned (the "Borrower") to secure Borrower's Note to 
..MOWNTAMWEST. SAVINGS. ANP. WAN 
(the "Lender") of the same date (the "Note") and covering the property described in the Security Instrument and 
located at 4695. .BURCH .CREEK.DRIVE,. SOUTH. .QGDEN, .UTAH . .84.4.03 
Property Address 
Modifications. In addition to the covenants and agreements made in the Security Instrument, Borrower and 
Lender further covenant and agree as follows: 
A. INTEREST RATE AND MONTHLY PAYMENT CHANGES 
The Note has an "Initial Interest Rate" of . J 2.-.1 /.2 . . . °7o. The Note interest rate may be increased or decreased 
on each Change Date, as described in the Note. Changes in the interest rate are governed by changes in the "Contract 
Interest Rate, Purchase of Previously Occupied Homes, National Average for all Major Types of Lenders" made 
available by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the "Index"). The interest rate cannot be changed to more than 
. 5-0. percentage points higher or lower than the Initial Interest Rate. 
If the interest rate changes, the amount of Borrower's monthly payments will change as provided in the Note. In-
creases in the interest rate will result in higher payments. Decreases in the interest rate will result in lower payments. 
B. LOAN CHARGES 
It could be that the loan secured by the Security Instrument is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges 
and that law is interpreted so that the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the 
loan would exceed permitted limits. If this is the case, then: (A) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amount 
necessary to reduce the charge to the permitted limit; and (B) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceed-
ed permitted limits will be refunded to Borrower. Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal 
owed under the Note or by making a direct payment to Borrower. 
C. TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY 
If there is a transfer of the Property subject to paragraph 17 of the Security Instrument, Lender may require 
either an increase in the current Note interest rate or an increase in the Base Index figure, or both, as a condition of 
Lender waiving the option to accelerate provided in paragraph 17. 
By signing this, Borrower agrees to all of the above. 
JAMES M. ROTHEY 
/? / QjJJ 
. ./DMMACU... ff.vVvAjL (Seal) 
BEVERLY pTHEY ft" -Borrower 
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DEED OF TRUST 
u 
THIS DEED OF TRUST is made this ?PXM day of. . AUG U.S.T. 
19 ?*. ., among the Trustor . . JAMES. .M . . ROT^EY .hW. . W ^ Y . M1Y&\ . lUl^ARP. .ANA .WIFE 
. .
A
.
S
. .JOINT. TENANTS
 ( h e rein "Borrower") 
MquntajnWest Savings and Loan (herein "Trustee"), and the Beneficiary, 
Mountain West Savings and Loan
 a corporation organized and 
j i i r Utah u j i • 2 4 0 6 WASHINGTON BLVD. 
^wim^A^n shf- ••••• whose a d d , rr s ,s • • • ••.•••• 
, (herein Lender ). BORROWER, in consideration of the indebtedness herein recited and the trust herein created, irrevocably grants 
and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the following described property located in the County of 
. . . VW ?.R. , State of Utah: 
ALL OF LOT 2, CROWTHER SUBDIVISION, IN SOUTH OGOEN CITY, WEBER 
COUNTY, UTAH, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF. 
which has the address of 
4695 BURCH CREEK DRIVE SOUTH OGDEN, UTAH 34403 
(Street] 
. (herein "Property Address"); 
tCity] 
(State and Zip Code] 
TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, rights, 
appurtenances, rents (subject however to the rights and authorities given herein to Lender to collect and apply such 
rents), royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and profits, water, water rights, and water stock, and all fixtures now or 
hereafter attached to the property, all of which, including replacements and additions thereto, shall be deemed to be 
and remain a part of the property covered by this Deed of Trust: and all of the foregoing, together with said property 
(or the leasehold estate if this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) ;:re herein referred to as the "Property": 
To SECURE to Lender (a) the repaxment of the indebtedness evidenced bv Borrower's note dated 
AUGUST. .2 9.,. . 1 9 . 8 1 (herein "Note"), in the principal sum of. .* 
SEVENTY . N I N E .THOUSAND .AND . 0 0 / 1 . 0 0 Dollars, with interest thereon, providing for monthly 
installments of principal and interest, with the balance of the indebtedness, if not sooner paid, due and payable on 
S.F,PTEMB.F,R. I , . .2 01 . )
 : t n c payment of all other sums, with 
interest thereon, advanced in accordance herewith to protect the security of this Deed of Trust; and the performance of 
the covenants and agreements of Borrower herein contained: and (b) the repayment of any future advances, with 
interest thereon, made to Borrower by Lender pursuant to paragraph 21 hereof (herein "Future Advances"). 
Borrower covenants that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the right to grant 
and convey the Property, that the Property is unencumbered, and that Borrower will warrant and defend generally 
the title to the Property against all claims and demands, subject to anv declarations, easements or restrictions listed 
in a schedule of exceptions to coverage in any title insurance policy insuring Lender's interest in the Property. 
UTAH—1 to 4 Family-6 75-FNMA/FHLMC UNIFORM INSTRUMENT 
r ww . ../., 
F 1 8 1 U T - B / 7 8 R ' " 
Empire Printing 
U N I F O R M COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows: 
1. Payment of Principal and Interest. Borrower shall promptly pay when due the principal of and interest on the 
indebtedness evidenced by the Note, prepayment and late charges as provided in the Note, and the principal of and interest 
on any Future Advances secured h\ this Deed of Trust. 
2. Funds for Taxes and Insurance. Subject to applicable law or to a written waiver by Lender, Borrower shall pay 
to I ender on the day monthly installments of principal and interest are payable under the Note, until the Note is paid in fu l l , 
a sum (herein "Funds ' ) equal to one-twelfth of the yearly taxes and assessments which may attain priority over this 
Deed of Trust, and ground rents on the Property, if any, plus one-twelfth of yearly premium installments for hazard insurance, 
plus one-twelfth of yearly premium installments for mortgage insurance, if any. all as reasonably estimated init ially and from 
time to time by Lender On the basis of assessments and bills and reasonable estimates thereof. 
The Funds shall be held in an institution the deposits or accounts of which are insured or guaranteed by a Federal or 
state agency (including Lender if Lender is such an institution). Lender shall apply the Funds to pay said taxes, assessments, 
insurance premiums and ground rents. Lcndei may not charge for so holding and applying the Funds, analyzing said account 
or verifying and compil ing said assessments and bills, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the Funds and applicable law 
permits Lender to make such a charge. Borrower and Lender may agree in wri t ing at the time of execution of this 
Deed of Trust that interest on the Funds shall be paid to Borrower, and unless such agreement is made or applicable law 
requires such interest to be paid. Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on the Funds Lender 
shall give to Borrower, without charge, an annual accounting of the Funds showing credits and debits to the Funds and the 
purpose for which each debit to the Funds was made. The Funds are pledged as additional security for the sums secured 
by this Deed of Trust. 
I f the amount of the Funds held by Lender, together with the future monthly installments of Funds payable prior to 
the due dates of taxes, assessments, insurance premiums and ground rents, shall exceed the amount required to pay said taxes, 
assessments, insurance premiums and ground rents as they fall due, such excess shall be. at Borrower's option, cither 
promptly repaid to Borrower or credited to Borrower on monthly installments of Funds. I f the amount of the Funds 
held by Lender shall not be sufficient to pay taxes, assessments, insurance premiums and ground rents as they fall due. 
Borrower shall pay to Lender any amount necessary to make up the deficiency within 30 days f rom the date notice is mailed 
by Lender to Borrower requesting payment thereof. 
Upon payment in ful l of all sums secured by this Deed of Trust. Lender shall promptly refund to Borrower any Funds 
held by Lender. I f under paragraph 18 hereof the Property is sold or the Property is otherwise acquired by Lender. Lender 
shall apply, no later than immediately prior to the sale of the Property or its acquisition by Lender, any Funds held by 
Lender at the time of application as a credit against the sums secured by this Deed of Trust. 
3. Appl icat ion of Payments. Unless applicable law provides otherwise, all payments received by Lender under the 
Note and paiagraphs 1 and 2 hereof shall be applied by Lender first in payment of amounts payable to Lender by Borrower 
under paragraph 2 hereof, then to interest payable on the Note, then to the principal of the Note, and then to interest and 
principal on any Future Advances. 
4. Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments and other charges, fines and impositions attributable to 
the Property which may attain a prior i ty over this Deed of Trust, and leasehold payments or ground rents, if any, in the 
manner provided under paragraph 2 hereof or, i f not paid in such manner, by Borrower making payment, when due, directly 
to the payee thereof. Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts due under this paragraph, and in the 
event Borrower shall make payment directly. Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender receipts evidencing such payments. 
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has prior i ty over this Deed of Trust; provided, that Borrower shall not be 
required to discharge any such lien so long as Borrower shall agree in wri t ing to the payment of the obligation secured by 
such lien in a manner acceptable to Lender, or shall in good faith contest such lien by, or defend enforcement of such lien in, 
legal proceedings which operate to prevent the enforcement of the lien or forfeiture of the Property or any part thereof. 
5. Hazard Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on the Property insured 
against loss by fire, hazards included within the term "extended coverage", and such other hazards as Lender may require 
and in such amounts and for such periods as Lender may require; provided, that Lender shall not require that the amount of 
such coverage exceed that amount of coverage required to pay the sums secured by this Deed of Trust. 
The insurance carrier providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to approval by Lender; provided, 
that such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. A l l premiums on insurance policies shall be paid in the manner 
provided under paragraph 2 hereof or, if not paid in such manner, by Borrower making payment, when due, directly to the 
insurance carrier. 
A l l insurance policies and renewals thereof shall be in form acceptable to Lender and shall include a standard mortgage 
clause in favor of and in form acceptable to Lender. Lender shall have the right to hold the policies and renewals thereof, 
and Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender all renewal notices and all receipts of paid premiums. In the event of loss, 
Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender may make proof of loss i f not made promptly 
by Borrower. 
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in wri t ing, insurance proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair of 
the Property damaged, provided such restoration or repair is economically feasible and the security of this Deed of Trust is 
not thereby impaired. I f such restoration or repair is not economically feasible or i f the security of this Deed of Trust would 
be impaired, the insurance proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Deed of Trust, wi th the excess, i f any, paid 
to Borrower. I f the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if Borrower fails to respond to Lender within 30 days f rom the 
date notice is mailed by Lender to Borrower that the insurance carrier offers to settle a claim for insurance benefits, Lender 
is authorized to collect and apply the insurance proceeds at Lender's option either to restoration or repair of the Property 
or to the sums secured by this Deed of Trust. 
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in wr i t ing, any such application of proceeds to principal shall not extend 
or postpone the due date of the monthly installments referred to in paragraphs I and 2 hereof or change the amount of 
such installments. I f under paragraph 18 hereof the Property is acquired by Lender, all right, title and interest of Borrower 
in and to any insurance policies and in and to the proceeds thereof resulting f rom damage to the Property prior to the saie 
or acquisition shall pass to Lender to the extent of the sums secured by this Deed of Trust immediately prior to such sale or 
acquisition. 
6. Preservation and Maintenance of Properly; Leaseholds; Condominiums; Planned Unit Developments. Borrower 
shall keep the Properly in good repair and shall not commit waste or permit impairment or deterioration of the Property 
and shall comply with the provisions of any lease if this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold. I f this Deed of Trust is on a unit in a 
condominium or a planned unit development. Borrower shall perform all of Borrower's obligations under the declaration 
or covenants creating or governing the condominium or planned unit development, the by-laws and regulations of the 
condominium or planned unit development, and constituent documents. I f a condominium or planned unit development 
rider is executed by Borrower and recorded together with this Deed of Trust, the covenants and agreements of such rider 
shall be incorporated into and shall amend and supplement the covenants and agreements of this Deed of Trust as if the rider 
were a part hereof. 
7. Protection of Lender's Security. I f Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this 
Deed of Trust, or if any action or proceeding is commenced which materially affects Lender's interest in the Property, 
including, but not l imited to, eminent domain, insoivenc). code enforcement, or arrangements or proceedings involving a 
bankrupt or decedent, then Lender at Lender's option, upon notice to Borrower, may make such appearances disburse such 
sums and take such action as is necessary to protect Lenders interest, including, but not l imited to disbursement of 
reasonable attorneys fees and entry upon the Property to make repairs. I f Lender required mortgage insurance as a 
condition of making the loan secured by this Deed of Trust. Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain such 
insurance in effect unti l such time as the requirement lor such insurance terminates in accordance with Borrower's and 
Lender's written agreement or applicable law. Borrower shall pa> the amount of all mortgage insurance premiums in the 
manner provided under paragraph 2 hereof. 
Any amounts disbursed by Lender pursuant to this paragraph 7, wi th interest thereon, shall become additional 
indebtedness of Borrower secured by this Deed ol Trust. Unless-Borrower and Lender agree to other terms of payment such 
amounts shall be payable upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting pavment thereof, and shall bear interest f rom the 
date of disbursement at the rate payable from time to time on outstanding principal under the Note unless payment of interest 
at such rate would be contrary to applicable law. in which event such amounts shall bear interest at the highest rate 
permissible under applicable law. Nothing contained in this paragraph 7 shall require Lender to incur any expense or take 
any action hereunder. 3 *^ 
8. Inspection. Lender may make or cause to be made reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property provided 
that Lender shall give Borrower nonce prior, to any such inspection specifying reasonable cause therefor related to Lender'* 
interest in the Property. U C I * 
• f ' ? • . * . , 
9. Condemnation. The proceeds of any award or claim for damages, direct or consequential, in connection with any 
condemnation or other taking of the Property, or part thereof, or for conveyance in lieu of condemnation, arc hereby assigned 
and shall be paid to Lender. 
i n the event of a total taking of the Property, the proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Deed o( Trust, 
wi th the excess, if any. paid to Borrower. In the event of u partial taking of the Property, unless Borrower and Lender 
otherwise agree in wr i t ing, there shall be applied to the sums secured by this Deed of Trust such proportion of the proceeds 
as is equal to that proportion which the amount of the sums secured by this Deed of Trust immediatel) prior to the date of 
taking bears to the fair market value oi the Property immediately prior to the date of taking, with the balance of the proceeds 
paid to Borrower. 
I f the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if. after notice by Lender to Borrower that the condemnor offers to make 
an award or settle a claim for damages. Borrower fails to respond to Lender within 30 da>s after the date such notice is 
mailed, Lender is authorized to collect and apply the proceeds, at Lender's option, either to restoration or repair of the 
Property or to the sums secured by this Deed of Trust. 
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in wri t ing, any such application of proceeds to principal shall not extend 
or postpone the due date of the monthly installments referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof or change the amount of 
such installments. 
10. Borrower No( Released. Extension of the time for payment or modification of amortization of the sums secured 
by this Deed of Trust granted by Lender to any successor in interest of Borrower shall not operate to release, in any manner, 
the l iabil i ty of the original Borrower and Borrower's successors in interest. Lender shall not be required to commence 
proceedings against such successor or refuse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortization of the sums 
secured by this Deed of Trust by reason of any demand made by the original Borrower and Borrower's successors in interest. 
11. Forbearance by Lender No( a Waiver. Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy hereunder, or 
otherwise afforded by applicable law, shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any such right or remedy 
The procurement of insurance or the payment of taxes or other liens or charges by Lender shall not be a waiver of Lender's 
right to accelerate the maturity of the indebtedness secured by this Deed of Trust. 
12. Remedies Cumulative. A l l remedies provided in this Deed of Trust arc distinct and cumulative to any other right 
or remedy under this Deed of Trust or afforded by law or equity, and may be exercised concurrently, independently or 
successively. 
13. Successors and Assigns Bound; Joint and Several Liabi l i ty; Captions. The covenants and agreements herein 
contained shall bind, and the rights hereunder shall inure to, the respective successors and assigns of Lender and Borrower, 
subject to the provisions of paragraph 17 hereof. A l l covenants and agreements of Borrower shall be joint and several. 
The captions and headings of the paragraphs of this Deed of Trust are for convenience only and are not to be used to 
interpret or define the provisions hereof. 
14. Notice. Except for any notice required under applicable law to be given in another manner, (a) any notice to 
Borrower provided for in this Deed of Trust shall be given by mailing such notice by certified mail addressed to Borrower at 
the Property Address or at such other address as Borrower may designate by notice to Lender as provided herein, and 
(b ) any notice to Lender shall be given by certified mai l , return receipt requested, to Lender's address stated herein or to 
such other address as Lender may designate by notice to Borrower as provided herein. Any notice provided for in this 
Deed of Trust shall be deemed to have been given to Borrower or Lender when given in the manner designated herein. 
15. Un i fo rm Deed of Trust; Governing Law; Severability. This form of deed of trust combines uniform covenants for 
national use and non-uniform covenants with l imited variations by jurisdiction to constitute a uni form security instrument 
covering real property. This Deed of Trust shall be governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located. 
In the event that any provision or clause of this Deed of Trust or the Note conflicts with applicable law, such conflict shall 
not affect other provisions of this Deed of Trust or the Note which can be given effect without the conflicting provision, 
and to this end the provisions of the Deed of Trust and the Note are declared to be severable. 
16. Borrower's Copy. Borrower shall be furnished a conformed copy of the Note and of this Deed of Trust at the time 
of execution or after recordation hereof. 
17. Transfer of the Property; Assumption. If all or any part of the Property or an interest therein is sold or transferred 
by Borrower without Lender's prior written consent, excluding (a) the creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to 
this Deed of Trust, (b ) the creation of a purchase money security interest for household appliances, (c ) a transfer by devise, 
descent or by operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant or (d ) the grant of any leasehold interest of three years or less 
not containing an option to purchase. Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums secured by this Deed of Trust to be 
immediately due and payable. Lender shall have waived such option to accelerate if, prior to the sale or transfer, Lender 
and the person to whom the Property is to be sold or transferred reach agreement in wr i t ing that the credit of such person 
is satisfactory to Lender and that the interest payable on the sums secured by this Deed of Trust shall be at such rate as 
Lender shall request. I f Lender has waived the option to'accelerate provided in this paragraph 17, and if Borrowers successor 
in interest has executed a written assumption agreement accepted in wr i t ing by Lender, Lender shall release Borrower from 
all obligations under this Deed of Trust and the Note. 
I f Lender exercises such option to accelerate. Lender shall mail Borrower notice of acceleration in accordance wi th 
paragraph 14 hereof. Such notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days f rom the date the notice is mailed within 
which Borrower may pay the sums declared due. If Borrower fails to pay such sums prior to the expiration of such period, 
Lender may, without further notice or demand on Borrower, invoke any remedies permitted by paragraph 18 hereof. 
N O N - U N I F O R M COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as fol lows: 
18. Acceleration; Remedies. Except as provided in paragraph 17 hereof, upon Borrower's breach of any covenant or 
agreement of Borrower in this Deed of Trust, including the covenants to pay when due any sums secured by this Deed of 
Trust, Lender prior to acceleration shall mail notice to Borrower as provided in paragraph 14 hereof specifying: (1) the 
breach; (2) the action required to cure such breach; (3) a date, not less than 30 days f rom the date the notice Is mailed to 
Borrower, by which such breach must be cured; and (4) that failure to cure suc"h breach on or before the date specified in the 
notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by (his Deed of Trust and sale of the Property. The notice shall further 
in form Borrower of the right (o reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence 
of a default or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale. I f the breach is not cured on or before the date 
specified in the notice, Lender at Lender's option may declare all of the sums secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately 
due and payable without further demand and (hose remedies permitted by applicable law may be invoked. Lender shall be 
entitled to collect all reasonable costs and expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this paragraph 18, 
including, but not l imited to, reasonable attorney's fees. 
I f the power of sale Is invoked. Trustee shall execute a written notice of the occurrence of an event of default and of the 
election to cause the Property to be sold and shall record such notice in each county in which the Property or some part 
thereof is located. Lender or Trustee shall mail copies of such notice in the manner prescribed by applicable law to Borrower 
and to the other persons prescribed by applicable law. Trustee shall give public notice of sale to the persons and in the 
manner prescribed by applicable law. After the lapse of such time as may he required by applicable law, Trustee, without 
demand on Borrower, shall sell the Proper!) at public auction to (he highest bidder at the time and place and under (he 
(erms designated in the notice of sale in one or more parcels and in such order as Trustee may determine. Trustee may 
postpone sale of all or any parcel of the Property by public announcement at the time and place of any previously scheduled 
sale. Lender or Lender's designee may purchase the Properly at any sale. 
Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Property so sold without any covenant or warranty, 
expressed or implied. The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie evidence of the truth of the statements made 
therein. Trustee shall apph the proceeds of the sale in the fol lowing order: (a) In all reasonable costs and expenses of (he 
sale, including, but not l imited to, reasonable Trustee's and aMorney's fees and costs of title evidence; (b) to all sums secured 
by this Deed of Trust; and (c) the excess, if any. to the person or persons legally entitled thereto or to the county clerk of the 
county in which the sale took place. 
19. Borrower's Right to Reinstate. Notwithstanding Lender's acceleration of the sums secured by this Deed of Trust, 
Borrower shall have the right to have any proceedings begun by lender to enforce this Deed of Trust discontinued at any time 
prior to the earlier to occur of (i) the fifth day before sale of the Property pursuant to the power of sale contained in this 
Deed of Trust or (n) entr> of a judgment enforcing this Deed o\ Trust if: (a) Borrower pays Lender all sums which would be 
then due under this Deed of Trust, the Note and notes securing Future Advances, if any. had no acceleration occurred; 
(b) Borrower cures all breaches of any other covenants or agreements of Borrower contained in this Deed of Trust; (c) 
Borrower pays all reasonable expenses incurred by Lender and Trustee in enforcing the covenants and agreements of Borrower 
contained in this Deed of Trust and in enforcing Lender's and Trustee's remedies as provided in paragraph 18 hereof, 
including, but not l imited to. reasonable attorney's fees: and (d) Borrower takes such action as Lender may reasonably require 
secured by this Deed of Trust shall continue unimpaired. Upon such payment and cure by Borrower, this Deed of Trust and 
the obligations secured hereby shall remain in full force and effect as it no acceleration had occurred. 
20. Assignment of Rents; Appointment of Receiver; Lender in Possession. As additional security hereunder. Borrower 
hereby assigns to Lender the rents of the Property, provided that Borrower shall, prior to acceleration under paragraph 18 
hereof or abandonment of the Property, have the right to collect and retain such rents as they become due and payable. 
Upon acceleration under paragraph IK hereof or abandonment of the Property. Lender, in person, by agent or by 
judicially appointed receiver, shall be entitled to enter upon, take possession of and manage the Property and to collect the 
rents of the Property, including those past due. A l l rents collected by Lender or the receiver shall be applied first to payment 
of the costs of management of ihc Property and collection of rents, including, but not l imited to. receiver's fees, premiums on 
receiver's bonds and reasonable attorneys fees, and then to the sums secured by this Deed of Trust. Lender and the receiver 
shall be liable to account only for those rents actually received. 
21 . Future Advances. Upon request of Borrower, Lender, at Lender's option prior to ful l reconveyance of the Property 
by Trustee to Borrower, may make Future Advances to Borrower. Such Future Advances, with interest thereon, shall be 
secured by this Deed of Trust when evidenced by promissory notes slating that said notes are secured hereby. 
22. Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Deed of Trust. Lender shall request Trustee to rcconvcy 
the Property and shall surrender this Deed of Trust and all notes evidencing indebtedness secured by this Deed of Trust to 
Trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the Property without warranty and without charge to the person or persons legally entitled 
thereto. Such person or persons shall pay all costs of recordation, if any. 
23. Substitute Trustee. Lender, at lender's option, may from time to time remove Trustee and appoint a successor 
trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder. Without conveyance of the Property, the successor trustee shall succeed to all 
the title, power and duties conferred upon the Trustee herein and by applicable law. 
24. Request for Notices. Borrower requests that copies of the notice of default and notice of sale be sent to Borrower's 
address which is the Property Address. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Borrower has executed this Deed of Trust. 
STATEOFUTAH,. ..W.E?.E.R Countys 
••ftPV 
On this. . . . 2RTI1 day of. . . A.UP«ST . 
. .JAMES. .M .. .ROTHEY . AND. .BF.VER.L.Y. K97. 
of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged ic 
My Commission expires: 
''/ 19. § I., personally a^^nred bcfpre'me 
/ ;V*.-., th'e'sifen^^ 
fccute/l the same. y .• ^ O \Cj 
I 
-. O 
v^. 
- J 
' yo 
v • " • . ^ 
Notary Public residing at: 
OGOF.N UTAH 
REQUEST FOR RECONVEYANCE 
To TRUSTEE: 
The undersigned is the holder of the note or notes secured by this Deed of Trust. Said note or notes, together 
with all other indebtedness secured by this Deed of Trust, have been paid in full. You arc hereby directed to cancel 
said note or notes and this Deed of Trust, which arc delivered hereby, and to reconvey, without warranty, all the 
estate now held by you under this Deed of Trust to the person or persons legally entitled thereto. 
Date: 
(Space Below This Line Reserved For Lender and Recorder) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
BRUCE C. EDWARD, 
Plaintiffs), 
vs. 
AMERICAN INTERSTATE MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION, a nonresident corporation, 
Defendant(s), 
i 
D E C I S I O N 
Case No.: 940900438 CN 
The issue before the court essentially is what is the current status of payments on the 
mortgage held by American Instate Mortgage. After considerable testimony it is clear at this 
point that the two payments at issue are for the months of June and July of 1993. 
Furthermore, after sorting through the tangled interaction between Mr. Edwards and 
American Interstate Mortgage, it is this Court's conclusion that there does not exist privity of 
contract between the parties such that Mr. Edwards can make demands on the mortgage company 
pursuant to the trust deed note, nor can the mortgage company make demands on Mr. Edwards 
to perform under the trust deed and note. 
Any interest in the property at this point held by Mr. Edwards arises out of the fact that he 
is a possessor of the subject property who has made payments on the note and may have made 
improvements to the property. As a result of the mortgage company's attempt to foreclose on the 
property which threatened Mr. Edward's possessory interest; this action is before the court. 
The court reaches the following conclusions. Mr. Edwards has not made the mortgage 
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payments for the months of June and July 1993. To bring the account current it is necessary that 
those two payments be made. Despite the mortgage companys numerous errors in determining 
what specific amounts were owed under the note, it would not be fair to simply ignore the clear 
fact that Mr. Edwards did not make those two payments. 
On the other hand, the mortgage company is not entitled to recover late fees and interest 
on the past due amount. By their own conduct they are precluded as a matter of equity from 
receiving the substantial sums they seek. The record is replete with examples of conflicting 
statements as to what was owed. It would be grossly unfair to require Mr. Edwards to pay 
penalties including interest when the demands made upon him were so highly contradictory of 
each other and inconsistent. 
Because the two payments are owed, they are due and payable within 15 days from the 
date of this Order. If they are not paid, then the mortgage company is entitled to proceed anew 
with a foreclosure action. 
In addition, in order to clarify the status of this account and prevent future confusion from 
developing, the Court finds based on the mortgage company's testimony, that the balance on the 
mortgage will be $60,538.88; after the June and July payments are made. 
With regard to Mr. Edwards claim that he is owed monies from the reserve account for 
overpayment on taxes and insurance, this Court declines to enter any order on that since his 
interest is possessory in nature, not contractual. Furthermore, those funds, pursuant to the Note, 
are not subject to being dispensed prior to payoff on the Note, but are held as security for the 
P.7K 
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Note. f 
No evidence was presented at trial in support of plaintiff s claim of Defamation of 
Character (Third Cause of Action). Slander of Title (Fourth Cause of Action) is not at issue since 
the evidence disclosed that Mr. Edwards does not hold title to the propeny. There is no evidence 
of Fraud or Extortion (Fifth Cause of Action) nor of Intentional Misrepresentation (Sixth Cause 
of Action). No claim was made at trial by plaintiff for punitive damages. 
DATED this j 2 £ ^ day of January, 1998. 
PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision, first 
class mail and postage prepaid, to the following parties this <=* day ot-January, 1998. 
DAVID J. KNOWLTON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
427 27th Street 
Ogden Utah 84401 
DOUGLAS DURBANO 
Attorney for Defendant 
3340 Harrison Blvd. #200 
Ogden Utah 84403 
\ 
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DAVID J. KNOWLTON 1850 
Attorney for Defendant Edwards 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621 4852 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN INTERSTATE ) S^^ 
MORTGAGE, 
Plaintiff. ) JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Vs. ) Civil No. 980907330 
MICHAEL E. FLYNN, et. al., ) Judge W. Brent West 
Defendant. ) 
Defendant Bruce C. Edwards' motion for order compelling discovery and for sanctions along 
with his motion to join James and Helen Edwards as parties to the action, and plaintiffs motions to 
dismiss the action as to Bruce C. Edwards and for the appointment of a receiver having all come on 
regularly for hearing on the 7th day of July, 1999, the Honorable W. Brent West, District Judge 
presiding, and the plaintiff appearing by and through his counsel of record, George W. Burbidge II, 
and the defendant Bruce C. Edwards appearing personally along with his counsel of record, David 
J. Knowiton and the court having heard and received the arguments of counsel and having examined 
the evidence offered, and being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore, 
now, 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that defendant Bruce C. 
Edwards shall have and is hereby granted further and additional judgment against the plaintiff in the 
sum of $500.00, together with lawful postjudgment interest thereon at the rate of 7.45% per annum 
until fully paid and satisfied. This judgment award is in addition to the judgment previously ordered 
in the above matter in the sum of $375.00, together with postjudgment interest thereon at the rate 
of 7.45% per annum at the hearing of April 28,1999. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that the plaintiff shall be and 
is hereby ordered to fully answer and comply with the defendant's Request for Production of 
Documents and Interrogatories served by defendant Edwards on or about the 9th of April, 1999, in 
the above matter. Specifically, the plaintiff shall answer and comply with paragraphs L, 6, 7, and 8 
of the discovery request. Plaintiff need not respond to paragraphs 2, 3. 4, and 5 of the request in 
view of the prior order of the court denying to plaintiff any attorney fees from defendant Edwards 
from the companion matter tried to Judge HefFernan. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that the trial date heretofore 
set in the above matter for the 27th day of July, 1999, shall be and is hereby stricken. The matter shall 
not be reset for trial until discovery by the parties has been completed and additional parties have been 
properly joined consistent with this order. Then these items are accomplished, then either of the 
parties may submit a new notice of readiness for trial and request for trial setting. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that all discovery in the 
matter shall end by the 30th of July, 1999. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that defendant Edwards' 
motion to join James and Helen Edwards as additional parties defendant shall be and is hereby 
granted, and plaintiff shall proceed to have them properly served with summons and complaint in the 
matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that plaintiffs motion to 
dismiss the action as to defendant Bruce C. Edwards shall be and is hereby denied. 
252 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that plaintiffs motion to 
appoint a receiver shall be and is hereby denied. 
<f* 
Dated this l ^ ' d a y of July, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
W. BRENT WEST 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Certify mailing a true and correct copy of the foregoing to George W. Burbidge II, Attorney 
for Plaintiff, 476 W. Heritage Park Blvd., Suite 200, Layton,/Wtah 84041^his 7th day of July, 1999, 
postage prepaid. 
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CERTIFICATE OP SALE 
CIVIL NO. 926902159 . ' 
I, Craig Dearden. Sheriff of Weber County, State of Utah, *1,> 
heraby certify that under and by virtue of an Execution issued 
out of the Second Judicial District Court in an action lately 
pending in said Court at the suit of Bolt and Nut Supply Company, 
Plaintiff, against Michael E. Flynn dba Commercidi 
Roofing/Reslder}tial Rooting, Defendant* attested on Che 15th day 
of July, 1992, by which I was commanded to make the sum of 
$54 5.23 with interest* costs, and Sheriff's Fees, amounting in 
all to the sum of S954-G9 to satisfy the judgment in said action 
out- of the personal property of said Defendant. if sufficient 
personal property could be found and if sufficient persona) 
property could not be found* than of the unexempted rea) property 
o£ the said Defendant. All as more fully appears by the said 
Writ, reference thereto being hereby made. I have levied upon, 
and on the lBth day of August, 1992. at 2:00 o'clock p-m. of said 
day at the East Front Door of the City and County Building, in 
Ogden Cityt Weber County* Utah duly sold at public auction, 
according to the law, and cfter due and legal notice to, Judgment 
Collection Systems for the sum of $1.00, lawful money of the 
United States, which was the highest bid made and the whole price 
paid for all the right, title, claim and interest of said 
Defendant, of in and to the following described real estate, to-
x*iv; 
All of Lot 2, Croweher Subdivision, South Ogden City. Weber 
County, Utah, Tax ID 0C »QC0 0000 
I further certify -char 5 a ^ p*-operty 5* «n>»i-ct *«-» 
redemption in lawful money of the Unitad State* pursuant to the 
statute in such cased made and provided* 
Dated at Ogden City, Utah, this 21st day of September, 1992-
CRAIG DEARDEN 
SHERIFF OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
By l-Tf^y TW;*-
CHIEF PAUL NEW] 
Deputy S h e r i f f 
The s i g n e r ( s ) of the w i th in instrument, who duly 
acknowledged t o me t h a t he executed the same. Date t h i s 21s t day 
of September, 1992 
Res id ing: Ogden, Utah 
Commiss ion E x p i r e s : 2/l<t/94> 
I^CTWP 
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COUNTY OF WEBER 
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Notice is hereby given, that under and by virtue of a Writ 
o£ Execution issued out ^o£ the District Court of the State of 
Utah, of which the annexed is a true copy. X have this day 
attached and levied upc^r all the right, title, claim and interest 
of Michael E. Flynn dba Commercial Roofing/Residential Roofing, 
defendants, or either of them, of. in ±n& to ths following 
described real estate, standing on the records of Weber County. 
in the name of Michael E. Flynn dba Commercial 
Roofing/Residential Roofing end particularly described as 
follows: 
All of Lot 2, Croweher Subdivision. 
Countyt Utah * Tax ID• 
South Ogden City, Weber 
CRAIG DEARDEN 
Sheriff of Vebar County, Utah 
$ By «££ 
Deputy Sher i f f 
^ 
< * 
$ 
^ 
*>> 
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I > 
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3 Ml 
The signer(e) of the within instrument, who duly acknowledge^ to 
me that: he executed the same* Dated July 22, 1992. 
Residing at: Ogden, Utah * 
My Commission Expires; 2/14/94* 
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"SHERIFF'S DEED 
THIS INDENTURE made between CRAIG DEARDEN, Sheriff of Weber 
County, State of Utah, referred herein as "SHERIFF", and James W. 
Edwards and Helen F. Edwards, as joint tenants, parties of the 
second part, 
WHEREAS, pursuant to a certain judgment and d£etee"''maae and 
entered by the Second Judicial District Court on the 15th day of 
July, 1992 in a certain action then pending in said Court, 
wherein Bolt and Nut Supply Company, Plaintiff, and Michael E. 
Flynn dba Commercial Roofing/Residential Roofing, Defendant, it 
was among other things ordered and adjudged that the hereinafter 
described real property should be sold at public auction by and 
under the direction of the Sheriff in the manner required by law. 
And, 
WHEREAS, the Sheriff did at the hour of 2:00 o'clock p.m. on 
the 18th day of August, 1992 at the front door of the Municipal 
Building in Ogden City, Weber County, Utah after due notice had 
been given, as required by law and said judgment, duly sell at 
public auction, the real property referred to in said judgment 
and hereinafter described; at which sale said real property was 
sold to Judgment Collection Systems for the sum of $1.00 Dollar, 
being the highest bidder and that being the highest sum bid at 
said sale. And, 
WHEREAS, said Judgment Collection Systems thereupon paid to 
the said Sheriff said sum of money, so bid and said Sheriff 
thereupon made and issued the usual certificate in duplicate of 
such sale in due form, and delivered one thereof to said buyer, 
and caused the other to be filed in the office of the County 
Recorder, Weber County, Utah. And, 
WHEREAS, more than six months have elapsed since the day of 
sale, and no redemption of the property so sold has been made. 
AND WHEREAS, said Judgment Collection Systems purchaser as 
aforesaid did, on the 19th day of August, 1992 sell assign and 
transfer said Certificate of Sale and all his rights thereunder 
to James W. Edwards and Helen F. Edwards, as joint tenants, the 
said parties of the second part, and duly authorized said Sheriff 
to make a deed for said premises, in pursuance of said sale to 
said James W. Edwards and Helen F. Edwards, as joint tenants. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Sheriff, in order to carry into effect 
said sale pursuant to said judgment and of the law, and also in 
consideration of the money so bid and paid, receipt of which is 
hereby acknowledged, by these presents does grant, sell and 
convey unto said party of the second part, the following 
described real property situated in Weber County, Utah, being all 
the right, title, and interest of the above named defendant in 
and to the following described property, to-wit: 
A l l of Lot 2, Croweher S u b d i v i s i o n , South Ogden City , Weber 
County, Utah. Tax ID 06-060-0002 ~ ~ ~ ^ r 
..: * ~A- *. V?~ "• 
Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments 
and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, 
to have and to hold the same_unto said parties of the second 
part, their heirs and assigns forever. ' •'<•_:..-
WITNESS the hand of said Sheriff this 25th day of May, 1994.' 
CRAIG DEARDEN 
Sheriff of Weber County, Utah 
Signed, Sealed and Delivered 
in the presence of: 
CAPTAIN WESLEY D. 
• Deputy Sherif 
ERRY --
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
ss 
On the 25th day of May, 1994 personally appeared beforeHmeT"1 
Captain Wesley D. Goldsberry, Deputy Sheriff of Weber County, 
State of Utah, the signer of the foregoing instrument, who" 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same as such Sheriff for 
the uses and purposes therein mentioned. 
1994. 
WITNESS my hand and notarial seal, this 25th day of May, 
NpfARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 1/26/98 
Residing at: Ogden, Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Certify mailing two true and correct copies of the foregoing to David J. Jordan, Attorney 
for PlaintifT/Appellant, 201 South Main Street, 1: 
day of July, 2001, postage prepaid. 
Xity, Utah 84111-4904 this 3rd 
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